Behind-the-border' regulatory policies and trade agreements by HOEKMAN, Bernard M.
PISSN 2508-1640 EISSN 2508-1667 an open access journal 
East Asian Economic Review vol. 22, no. 3 (September 2018) 243-273 
http://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2018.22.3.344 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
 




European University Institute and CEPR 
Bernard.Hoekman@EUI.eu 
 
A consequence of global trade liberalization is that domestic regulatory policies have 
become a focal point for efforts to reduce the costs of engaging in cross-border production 
and exchange. This article discusses the general challenges of reducing trade frictions 
created by regulatory differences, focusing specifically on the role trade agreements might 
play in addressing regulatory spillovers. A case is made for a greater focus on plurilateral 
cooperation under the umbrella of the WTO. 
Keywords: Nontariff Measures, Regulation, Regulatory Cooperation, WTO, Trade 
Agreements 




With the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, much 
of the vision of the drafters of the 1948 International Trade Organization (ITO) 
Charter was realized, albeit some 50 years later.1 The average level of tariffs for 
OECD member countries has fallen to the 3% range; for major emerging economies 
like China and India as well as many developing countries the average applied 
tariff is less than 10%. In conjunction with the abolition of most of the quantitative 
 
* This paper draws on ongoing research with Charles Sabel. An earlier version appeared online as 
Hoekman (2017). Thanks are due to constructive suggestions by three anonymous referees. 
1 The ITO was supposed to complement the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 
area of trade-related policy, but never entered into force as a result of a decision by the US 
government not to submit the treaty for approval by the Congress. 
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import restrictions to trade that were prevalent through the 1980s, policies to open 
markets to direct investment – including through privatization, and technological 
changes that greatly reduced the costs of international communications and transport, 
the result has been major changes in the structure of global production and trade. 
One illustration of this change is the increasing share of global value chains (GVCs) 
in international production and the associated trade in intermediate parts, components 
and tasks.  
Policy-induced market access frictions and trade costs today are increasingly 
regulatory in nature. The rapidly changing composition of trade as a result of technical 
changes – reflected not only in supply chains that span many countries, but the 
growth in services trade and cross-border data flows associated with the servicification 
and digitization of products (the “Internet of things”) is moving national regulation 
to center stage in trade debates. The associated agenda is not about deregulation – 
what is driving concerns in the business community are the trade-impeding (cost-
raising) effects of differences in applicable domestic health, safety, privacy and data 
security standards, prudential and licensing requirements, certification and compliance 
assessment procedures for both products and production processes used by suppliers 
of goods and services. 
Since its creation WTO members have found it very difficult to negotiate new 
rules of the game. Disagreements among countries regarding the benefits of committing 
to additional trade policy disciplines, most notably between the United States and 
other OECD nations on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil and India 
on the other, have impeded progress on the WTO’s traditional market access agenda 
(mostly tariffs and agricultural support) and in turn blocked substantive discussion 
on the trade effects of domestic regulatory policies. Continued deadlock in the WTO 
starting in 2008 led to the focus of attention in addressing international regulatory 
spillovers shifting to other fora – notably preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
Examples of recent initiatives with a significant focus on regulatory matters include 
the negotiations on a Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) between 12 Pacific countries 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU 
and the US that were launched in 2013.  
Both the TTIP and TPP initiatives illustrate that such new vintage agreements 
are difficult to conclude. TTIP talks were put on hold by the US at the end of 2016, 
and one of the first actions of the Trump Administration in early 2017 was to withdraw 
from TPP. However, deep PTAs that span regulatory matters continue to be pursued 
 ‘Behind-the-Border’ Regulatory Policies and Trade Agreements  245 
ⓒ 2018 East Asian Economic Review 
by major trading nations. Examples include the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU which entered into force 
in 2017,2 the 2018 EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the successful 
conclusion of talks between eleven of the original signatories of the TPP to establish 
a Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).  
Pursuit of regulatory cooperation and related rules of the road is a second-best 
solution, given that the organization of production and trade into GVCs and international 
production networks means that end products are impacted by many regulatory 
jurisdictions. PTAs almost by definition will not span all the countries involved in 
many (most) GVCs, thus limiting the positive impact that they can have in addressing 
regulatory differences and uncertainty for firms and consumers, while at the same 
time giving rise to the possibility that PTA-based regulatory initiatives may generate 
trade and investment diversion. Trade agreements are not the only game in town 
to address regulatory spillovers. Governments may and have pursued different types 
of regulatory cooperation efforts, ranging from sector-specific initiatives such as 
mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) to cross-sectoral, “horizontal” efforts that 
center on “practice” and learning from international experience and more formal 
mechanisms such as the Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council (Canada, 2014) 
that operate independently of a prevailing trade agreement (i.e. NAFTA).  
What follows discusses the general challenges confronting international regulatory 
cooperation from the perspective of reducing trade frictions. Section 1 defines the 
task confronting policymakers and develops a typology of the types of initiatives 
that can be used to reduce negative trade spillovers created by regulatory differences. 
Section 2 discusses the question what role a trade agreement might play in addressing 
regulatory spillovers, something that arguably has not been considered seriously 
 
2  http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text- 
texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng. (accessed December 10, 2017) Only two chapters of CETA deal 
with reductions in import tariffs and the removal of discrimination in government procurement — 
that is, classic market access issues where there are direct restrictions on the ability of foreign 
companies to supply products. The majority of the substantive chapters of CETA deal with product 
regulation, customs procedures, trade facilitation, policies affecting specific services sectors, mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications, domestic regulation more generally, procedures for regulatory 
cooperation and dialogue, and sector-specific protocols (e.g. on the mutual acceptance of the results 
of the conformity assessment of good manufacturing practices for pharmaceutical products). 
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enough by the trade community. Section 3 briefly reviews some of the extant 
disciplines and provisions in the WTO that have a bearing on domestic regulatory 
policies. Section 4 does the same for recent PTAs. Section 5 suggests some limited 
initiatives that could be pursued under WTO auspices or in a plurilateral trade 
setting. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. DIMENSIONS OF REGULATORY COOPERATION 
 
Competition between regulatory regimes is the default situation in international 
relations, with different jurisdictions independently applying their own set of regulations 
to products and producers. While competition implies differences in applicable 
standards across countries, over time, as learning occurs, there may be incentives 
to emulate more successful approaches and norms, generating convergence over 
time. Competition is a powerful discovery mechanism and a force that will help to 
identify more efficient forms of regulation to achieve a given objective. But competition 
may also have adverse outcomes. The commonly expressed fear of a “race to the 
bottom” is one possibility, albeit one for which there is generally little evidence. A 
much more frequent consequence of competition are excess costs associated with 
different regulatory regimes that have similar objectives. In such cases there are 
potential gains from cooperation. 
International regulatory cooperation is difficult. There have been long-standing 
transatlantic efforts to cooperate on regulatory matters, with only limited success 
(Vogel, 2012). The most progress has been achieved in the EU in the context of 
creating a single European market for goods and services, as this required overcoming 
the trade-impeding effects of differences in product market regulation. This was 
pursued through a variety of approaches, ranging from harmonization of new regulations 
to mutual recognition (Pelkmans, 2012).3 The EU is of course sui generis. The 
 
3 Mutual recognition involves agreement that products legally introduced into the commerce of one 
jurisdiction may be sold and consumed without additional controls in another jurisdiction. To take 
the example of food safety standards, mutual recognition between A and B implies that A recognizes 
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more general challenge confronting the trade community is to identify approaches 
to reducing trade costs through regulatory cooperation in the absence of a political 
commitment to fully integrate markets and without supranational institutions that 
are tasked with reducing the market segmenting effects of national policies.  
In principle, addressing this challenge should be facilitated if regulatory objectives 
are equivalent across countries and economies have similar income levels. Approaches 
may differ towards reducing risk and avoiding catastrophic events, but if goals are 
very similar, regulatory cooperation may reduce compliance costs without undercutting 
the attainment of national regulatory objectives. The agenda here is not just about 
reducing compliance costs for firms and thus prices for consumers. More important 
is that cooperation enhances the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of regulation. 
Cooperation must be a mechanism that improves regulatory outcomes over time in 
all participating jurisdictions (Hoekman and Sabel, 2017). It may well be that 
improving regulatory effectiveness and efficiency will also reduce costs. More generally, 
improving regulatory coherence across countries is likely to lower trade costs by 
enhancing transparency and information on applicable regulatory norms. A basic 
question for policymakers is how best to design international regulatory cooperation 
so that it enhances regulatory performance and lowers trade costs. This requires 
knowledge about both the potential benefits and the political feasibility of cooperation. 
Figure 1 distinguishes between the magnitude of net economic gains from regulatory 
cooperation and the political and technical difficulty (cost) of implementing the 
necessary cooperation. In principle, cooperation should center on areas that fall 
into the bottom-right cell D and on efforts to move items from C to D. As important 
is to avoid investing resources in regulatory areas that fall into box A. Mapping 
policy areas into these different categories cannot simply be based on technical 
analysis but requires active engagement by regulators, business and consumers. 
Regulators should be interested in those activities and initiatives that increase their 
ability to achieve their mandate more effectively and efficiently. Business presumably 
would like to see compliance costs fall, while citizens and consumers may worry 
 
that the norms prevailing in B satisfy its own safety norms and vice versa. If the underlying norms 
in the two jurisdictions differ enough, such an approach is not feasible. Even if A and B harmonize 
their norms, trade still might be affected by redundant costs if both continue to inspect products 
before they are allowed to be sold. Only if A and B mutually recognize (accept) that their respective 
enforcement systems are effective will harmonization eliminate regulatory trade costs. 
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that cooperation will erode regulatory standards, resulting in a “race to the bottom.” 
This is a major factor underlying the resistance by some civil society groups in the 
EU, Korea and other nations to PTAs that involve “deep integration” (see, for 
example, Cardoso et al., 2013 on fears that a TTIP could do so). The result of these 
different entry points implies that not all issues will lend themselves equally to 
cooperation. Insofar as the areas of concern fall into boxes C or D, a precondition 
for cooperation is to address the worries of either regulators and/or consumers that 
make an issue area politically sensitive. But efforts to do so through joint learning 
and interaction should prioritize areas that offer the highest potential economic 
benefits. In some instances this may not be possible; in others it may require a 
substantial amount of time to establish the needed understanding and trust to allow 
cooperation to occur. There is therefore a dynamic time dimension to this two-by-
two matrix. 
 
Figure 1. Net Economic Payoffs and Feasibility of Cooperation 
  Political/technical costs 
  High Low 
Net economic benefits 
Low A B 
High C D 
 
Various approaches have been pursued to attenuate international regulatory spillovers 
(OECD, 2013). These include seeking to converge over time on the substance of new 
regulatory norms (harmonization and international standardization), accepting differences 
in regulation and focusing on putting in place processes to address negative spillover 
effects of such differences through mutual recognition agreements or determinations 
of regulatory equivalence, and efforts to increase “coherence” across regulatory regimes. 
The latter generally center on identifying good practices and basic principles such 
as transparency, consultations with stakeholders, use of impact assessments, and 
so on.4 
 
4 There is of course an extensive literature on the various options and experiences; see for example, 
Vogel (2012) and OECD (2014). Much of the focus will (have to) be sector specific; see, for 
example, Arnold (2005), Bismuth (2010) and Verdier (2011) for analyses of services regulation. 
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Cooperation can be characterized along a spectrum of “soft” to “hard” depending 
on how binding (enforceable) the commitments are, with agreements ranging from 
“shallow” to “deep” depending on whether they entail commitments not to do something 
or go beyond that to require positive action. Efforts to increase coherence across 
regulatory regimes are an example of “soft” cooperation. They have been a central 
element of international initiatives on regulation pursued in the OECD and APEC, 
which focus on principles and processes as opposed to the substance of regulation.  
“Shallow” types of cooperation may be limited to commitments to enhance the 
transparency and visibility of extant regulation and new regulatory initiatives, or 
they may go further and involve creation of processes through which parties inform 
and/or consult each other or commit to providing opportunities for comment before 
adopting new regulations. Some instances of “shallow” regulatory cooperation 
may be relatively straightforward to apply to a large number of countries, as they 
are in the nature of focal points and guidance for national policy. Whether or not a 
country implements the principles or good practices will not have a direct effect 
on the realization of regulatory goals in another nation. 
Deeper forms of regulatory cooperation have implications for the realization of 
regulatory objectives – they create interdependence between jurisdictions: the attainment 
of a regulatory goal in country A becomes a function of actions by country B. 
Deeper forms of cooperation span a range of possibilities, from harmonization at 
one extreme – i.e. adopting the same norms – to (mutual) recognition agreements 
or acceptance of the equivalence of regulatory regimes.  
Figure 2 illustrates different types of regulatory cooperation and lists a number 
international institutions and fora that have been created to support their implementation. 
There are many examples of both “shallow” and “deep” regulatory cooperation – 
the ones mentioned in Figure 2 are just illustrative.5 Many (most) of these do not 
involve trade agreements, but some do. The alternative approaches can all be embedded 
 
5 Major international regulatory/standards-setting bodies include the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
the International Electrotechnical Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
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into trade agreements. There are several mentions of the WTO in Figure 2, reflecting 
the fact that its multilateral agreements – GATT, GATS and TRIPS – make references 
to harmonization (international standardization) and/or mutual recognition agreements, 
even if there is no legal obligation imposed on all WTO members to harmonize their 
norms or to recognize those of trading partners (the WTO status quo is discussed 
below). 
 
Figure 2. A Typology of Regulatory Cooperation and Illustrative Examples 
 Global Plurilateral Bilateral 
‘Shallow’ cooperation 
Coherence  BCBS, UNCITRAL, ISO; 
ICN; WTO 




Consultation OIE, IOSCO, WHO,   
WTO: TBT/SPS
EU; G20 RCC (Canada-US) 
‘Deeper’ forms of cooperation 
Recognition 
(MRAs) CIPM; ILAC; IAF 











FSB, ESMA, EU, ICH RCC (new regulations) 
Notes: ANCERTA: Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement; BCBS: Basle 
Committee for Banking Supervision; BIT: bilateral investment treaty; CIPM: International Committee 
for Weights and Measures; FSB: Financial Stability Board; GPA: WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement; IAF: International Accreditation Forum; ICH: International Conference on Harmonization 
of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use; ICN: International 
Competition Network; ILAC: International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation; OIE: World 
Organization for Animal Health; RCC: Regulatory Cooperation Council; VSS: voluntary sustainability 
standards. 
 
Coherence involves efforts among jurisdictions to ensure that the regulatory process 
conforms to what are generally accepted to be good practices: e.g., ensuring that 
regulation is transparent; that there is the opportunity for stakeholders, including 
foreign firms and governments, to comment on proposed new regulations, or that 
the process of regulatory development should be informed by an economic impact 
assessment or a cost/benefit analysis. The aim here is not to question or discuss the 
objectives or the substance of regulation. Instead the focus is on the process through 
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which regulation is developed and implemented. Coherence is an important element 
of WTO disciplines on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) and has been the focus of work programs in organizations 
such as the OECD, various UN bodies and APEC for many years.  
Consultation goes beyond joint efforts to define and implement good practices 
(coherence) and begins to engage with the substance of regulation and its spillover 
effects. Examples include the scope that has been created in the WTO to raise 
specific trade concerns (STCs) regarding (proposed) TBT and SPS measures (Wijkström, 
2015) and the framework that has been established for consultations on regulatory 
matters through the Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC). 
Deeper forms of cooperation go further in seeking to reduce the market-segmenting 
effects of differences in regulation across countries. Examples are agreements to 
(mutually) recognize a foreign regulatory process, efforts between regulators to 
determine instances where regulatory regimes are equivalent, and efforts to adopt 
common regulatory standards or conformity assessment processes —i.e. harmonization 
of norms. Such deeper forms of regulatory cooperation are difficult to achieve for 
a number of reasons. There may be (i) mandate gaps, in that domestic regulators 
are not permitted to pursue cooperation or have not been given the resources to do 
so; (ii) coordination gaps in instances where international cooperation requires 
several regulatory agencies within a country to work together; or (iii) informational 
gaps within and across countries, such as a lack of data on how a regulatory regime 
“works” (Hoekman, 2015). Addressing these gaps requires institutions and processes 
that foster regular communication and repeated interaction. This is needed both 
across agencies within countries – frequently multiple regulators and government 
bodies are engaged in setting and enforcing product and process regulations – and 
across countries. This is non-trivial, especially in federal states, where regulation 
is applied at the state level (for example, in 13 provinces and territories in Canada, 
29 states in India and 50 states in the US). In the case of the EU, the 28 member 
states continue to have significant autonomy in the implementation of regulation 
in many areas. 
Regulators frequently have their own mechanisms through which they interact 
with each other internationally. Governments at different levels (central, sub-central, 
municipal), regulators and international businesses are all engaged in mechanisms 
that entail cooperation with counterparts across borders (jurisdictions). Lead firms 
set standards for quality, health and safety for both products and processes that 
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occur in their supply chains. They may cooperate in private standards-setting activities 
that have as a goal achievement of inter-operability and minimum standards across 
supply chains. They may work in cooperation with non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and governments to do so (and example being the Global Food Safety Initiative). 
NGOs do the same – there is a plethora of different private standards-setting bodies 
that develop norms and offer certification services to companies that engage in 
international trade. The characterization of levels of “regulatory” cooperation in 
Figure 2 also applies to the world of private standards, as is illustrated by the 
inclusion of several such initiatives. 
 
III. WHAT ROLE FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS? 
 
A key question for policymakers is whether, given a presumption that there are 
good reasons for pursuing regulatory cooperation, this should be embedded in trade 
agreements. Given a rationale for regulatory cooperation, what is the value added 
of tying this to a trade agreement as opposed to simply giving regulators a mandate 
to interact and work together to improve regulatory requirements and processes? 
Assuming policymakers determine it is useful to embed regulatory cooperation into 
trade agreements, an ancillary question is whether this is best pursued through the 
multilateral forum (the WTO), through PTAs or both. In practice the answer is likely 
to depend on the feasibility of engaging in cooperation with a large number of countries 
(regulators), the payoffs of doing so for each participating entity and the extent to 
which idiosyncratic domestic regulatory regimes give rise to trade costs for international 
businesses. These are very much open questions to which this article will not provide 
answers. What is clear however is that the type of factors discussed briefly in the 
previous section will play an important role. 
Trade agreements are designed to reduce explicit discrimination against foreign 
suppliers of goods and services. An implication is that traditional sector-specific 
regulation that entails barriers to entry lends itself to the reciprocal bargaining and 
market access commitments that are the core feature of trade agreements. As such 
regulation can be “captured” by incumbent firms who use their political influence 
to ensure that they have favorable treatment (Stigler, 1975), a very similar dynamic 
as that underpinning trade negotiations can be used to reform such types of regulation. 
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However, while entry-restricting regulation continues to exist for some sectors – 
especially in some services – in the 1980s and 1990s regulation changed in nature. 
Regulation is no longer dominated by efforts to control the behavior of firms in sectors 
in which entry is restricted.6 Instead, the focus is on ensuring that markets are 
contestable and on the use of market conduct and liability rules that are (supposed to 
be) applied equally to domestic and foreign goods and services to do so, complemented 
by mechanisms to elicit revelation of information by firms on their costs (Laffont, 
1994; Posner, 2013). 
The source of regulatory trade costs lies in differences in regulations across jurisdictions 
and the need to comply with the requirements of multiple regulatory bodies in different 
countries. As already noted, reducing the market-segmenting effects of differences 
in regulations is difficult because of concerns that it may compromise countries’ 
regulatory objectives and hinder the execution of regulatory agencies’ legal mandates 
and obligations. This implies that reciprocal commitments to change national policies 
— the bread and butter of trade agreements — often simply will not be feasible. 
The nature of regulation is technical and dynamic, involving many actors with different 
degrees of autonomy and decentralization; moreover, regulators will respond to 
differences in local circumstances and changes in knowledge over time. This makes 
it difficult — indeed, undesirable — to ‘negotiate’ substantive changes in regulation 
or to impose regulatory harmonization or convergence by fiat. Instead, regulatory 
cooperation must be premised on mutual assessments of performance of regulatory 
regimes to enable regulators to assure principals (stakeholders, legislatures) that 
the other party has effective systems in place. In practice, convergence, if it occurs 
at all, will most likely be gradual, with partner countries over time moving closer 
to systems that are constructed and implemented the same way. 
The increasing complexity and interdependence of modern economies that is 
reflected in the growth in collaborative international production networks (GVCs) 
has led to forms of what has been called meta-regulation (Coglianese and Mendelson, 
2010). Meta-regulation involves the establishment of monitoring and learning regimes. 
 
6 A caveat to this is that state-owned or state-controlled enterprises continue to be prevalent in many 
countries. Insofar as this is associated with barriers to entry for investment by foreign-owned 
companies, trade agreements can be used as instruments through which to seek to impose market 
disciplines on such entities. 
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Instead of presuming that regulators should define uniform rules based on scientific 
evidence, the aim of meta-regulation is to create incentives for companies to invest 
resources in regular collection and analysis of data to identify and mitigate specific 
risks they either confront or may generate. Such approaches are salient in the context 
of GVCs. For example, ingredients contaminated with pathogens are periodically 
introduced into global food supply chains and widely propagated as the adulterated 
foodstuffs are incorporated into diverse batches of processed products. The inadvertent 
co-production of hazards by firms that are part of international networks —often 
identifiable years after products have entered commerce—calls for regulatory 
approaches that recognize such possibilities and that are designed to generate and 
disseminate relevant data to all parties concerned on a timely basis (Hoekman and 
Sabel, 2017).  
As a result of the type of uncertainty that accompanies GVC-based production 
and extensive cross-border flows and interdependence, the regulatory problem 
becomes one of organizing and supervising joint investigation by firms of emergent 
risks and responding to them before they cause harm. This is a problem that calls for 
approaches that involve data collection, data analysis and data sharing. An example 
is the use of hazard analysis of critical control points (HACCPs) for pathogens, 
implemented on both sides of the Atlantic, involving a mix of administrative action, 
legislation and private standards (Sabel and Simon, 2011; Humphrey, 2012).  
From a trade policy perspective the emerging shift towards meta-regulation 
raises the question whether and how trade agreements can support this type of 
regulatory cooperation. To date, efforts in this direction in recent trade agreements 
such as the CPTPP and CETA have centered on provisions calling for regulatory 
coherence. Going beyond this is perhaps less obvious than often seems to be assumed. 
Trade agreements can be characterized as purposeful efforts to align the behaviors 
of key players (governments in particular, and through them, regulatory agencies) 
in a top-down manner, i.e., by inclusion of provisions requiring government entities 
to behave in a specific way – or more frequently, not to engage in certain practices. 
However, insofar as regulation increasingly revolves around a decentralized effort 
at problem solving – i.e. bottom-up mechanisms – a potential role for trade 
agreements to support regulatory cooperation is by acting as a device to support 
credible commitments to pursue a bottom-up approach centered on problem-solving 
by creating an institutional framework that promotes and supports this. Whether 
trade agreements can be designed to do so is an open question – one that has not 
 ‘Behind-the-Border’ Regulatory Policies and Trade Agreements  255 
ⓒ 2018 East Asian Economic Review 
been the subject of much research. There are many examples of meta-regulation 
that spans regulatory agencies in multiple countries, but these tend to emerge outside 
the contours of trade agreements.7 
Perhaps the most straightforward case for using trade agreements is that this will 
help ensure that the trade effects of regulation are considered explicitly. Regulators 
often do not consider the international implications of what they do. To a large extent 
this is simply because they are not called to do so by their authorizing environment. 
They may be limited in their appreciation of the economic effect and costs associated 
with implementation of their regime on firms and consumers in other jurisdictions. 
A necessary condition for regulators to consider the (cross-border) economic implications 
of their work is that they have incentives to do so, which raises issues related not 
just to their legal mandates but also the design of institutional mechanisms that 
facilitate learning and a better understanding of the overall impact of regulatory 
norms on trade and investment incentives. In terms of the typology of Figure 1, a 
trade agreement may help in identifying which areas of regulation fall into boxes 
C and D.  
Trade agreements may also be used as an instrument to generate the political 
oversight needed for implementation of cooperation. An important feature of trade 
agreements is that there are a large number of interests represented. This can not 
only ensure that areas that are priorities from a trade perspective are identified and 
put on the table, but also help overcome political economy constraints that preclude 
movement in a direction that governments perceive will enhance aggregate welfare. 
Regulators may have a vested interest in the status quo, or have been captured by 
a domestic industry. Focusing on such problems in a trade agreement context may 
help mobilize the political support needed to push through reforms. Referring back 
to Figure 1, dealing with regulatory matters in a trade agreement may help move 
forward over time on issues that are in boxes C and D. 
 
7 Hoekman and Sabel (2017) discuss specific examples, including the Bilateral Aviation Safety 
Agreement between the EU and the US. This covers principally the airworthiness of equipment 
from design to manufacture and maintenance, as well as conformity to environmental standards, 
and is a comprehensive framework governing mutual recognition of air safety certification systems. 
It includes a formal structure for dispute resolution and allows for possible extension to new areas 
of air safety. 
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Addressing regulatory issues in a trade agreement also may benefit regulators if 
it helps to mobilize additional resources to support cooperation. This can both support 
greater attention being given to cooperation – as that will entail a resource cost for 
the agencies involved – and, indirectly but potentially importantly, allow for a 
reallocation of scarce resources to other areas. That is, if cooperation is successful 
– for example, it results in acceptance that two regimes are equivalent – regulators 
can allocate less to surveillance of that particular issue area and focus more on other 
concerns. The benefits of regulatory cooperation accrue not just to companies and 
consumers in the form of lower compliance costs; if it results in reductions in operating 
costs for a regulatory agency, this will release resources for other purposes. 
The feasibility of international regulatory cooperation will depend on the countries 
that pursue it. Developing countries with more limited capacity to design and implement 
regulatory policies to ensure the safety of products or discipline the economic behavior 
of firms may be constrained in their ability to engage in even the shallowest forms 
of cooperation. In practice many developing countries will be ‘rule-takers’, having 
to adopt and comply with standards set either through international processes in which 
they have little if any capacity to engage, or by large developed countries. This may 
give rise to conflicts insofar as the norms concerned are not optimal from the perspective 
of the developing country. The scope for this will be attenuated if standards are set 
through international mechanisms in which many countries participate. Trade agreements 
can help move countries towards adoption of international standards and regulatory 
norms by making this a principle or objective of the agreement. They can also help 
address capacity differentials and weaknesses that impede the ability to apply basic 
principles such as transparency, notification and allowing for comment from stakeholders 
on proposed new regulation. Resource constraints can be overcome through technical 
assistance and capacity-building activities aimed at improving regulatory systems 
and governance in developing nations. Including commitments in trade agreements 
to provide assistance to support regulatory cooperation can help to pit in place the 
preconditions for developing nations to participate and benefit from regulatory 
cooperation. The 2013 WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) provides an example.8 
 
 
8 Implementation of TFA disciplines by developing countries can be made conditional on provision 
of technical and financial assistance from high-income countries. See e.g., Hoekman (2016). 
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IV. THE WTO STATUS QUO 
 
In principle, the WTO is the global apex institution through which governments 
can seek to address cross-border spillovers created by national trade-related policies. 
The primary focus in the WTO is on trade policies, but the agreement also spans 
disciplines on domestic regulation, motivated by a concern that these not be used 
to discriminate against foreign products and undercut liberalization commitments. 
The national treatment rule is a general obligation for goods, whereas it is a specific 
one in the case of services – applying only to scheduled services/modes of supply. 
The WTO does not engage on the substance of regulatory measures—all it requires 
is that foreign products are treated the same as domestic ones. The WTO does embody 
some disciplines that require minimum levels of regulation – for example, the TRIPS 
agreement requires Members to implement minimum standards of protection for 
intellectual property – but the substance of the rights and requirements/criteria involved 
are left to other international bodies to determine. 
Concerns that product-specific regulatory norms may be used for protectionist 
purposes has motivated the negotiation of specific disciplines that go further than 
the national treatment rule. The main examples are the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Measures. The TBT agreement addresses technical requirements (mandatory regulatory 
norms) imposed by governments for goods; the SPS agreement deals with mandatory 
health and safety-related norms for agricultural products (foodstuffs, plant and animal 
health). The TBT agreement goes further than national treatment by requiring that 
Members base their product regulation on available international standards (whenever 
appropriate) and adopt the least trade-restrictive measure that is necessary to achieve 
their regulatory objective.9 The SPS agreement makes explicit reference to an indicative 
list of international bodies that promulgate SPS norms, such as the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. If a national product-specific regulatory measure is based on an international 
standard, it is presumed to satisfy the least trade-restrictive test in that the norms are 
 
9 What follows focuses on the TBT agreement. Similar considerations apply to the SPS agreement. 
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considered to be necessary and non-discriminatory in effect and in intent.10 Whether 
this is in fact the case is another matter, as in practice the process of international 
standardization may not devote much attention to trade effects. The presumption 
is that because many countries will be involved in the process of defining international 
standards, whatever is agreed is regarded as being non-discriminatory in intent, no 
matter the actual effect on trade. As argued below, this is one weakness of the current 
approach in the WTO towards international standardization. 
Many of the standards that confront firms operating internationally address 
management processes and production methods. Systems such as ISO 9000, ISO 
14000 and ISO 26000 are used by companies as a signal of quality, a demonstration 
of a commitment to social responsibility or as requirements that must be met by suppliers 
in a trade relationship with buyers or by companies that are part of international 
value chains and production networks. Standards of this type are not covered by 
the WTO as they are not mandatory. 
Conformity assessment procedures for technical product regulations are also 
subject to WTO disciplines, including the non-discrimination rule. Relevant guides 
or recommendations issued by international standardizing bodies are to be used if 
they exist, except if inappropriate for national security reasons or deemed inadequate 
to safeguard health and safety. In principle, WTO Members are free to join and use 
international systems for conformity assessment. The results of conformity assessment 
procedures undertaken in exporting countries must be accepted if consultations 
determine these are equivalent to domestic ones. WTO members are encouraged 
to negotiate MRAs for conformity assessment procedures, and not to discriminate 
between foreign certification bodies in their access to such agreements. 
The SPS and TBT Committees have been characterized as technical expert-
driven catalysts for multilateral dialogue, providing a forum for the development 
of guidance (soft law) and peer review of trade measures (Wijkström, 2015). An 
 
10 One reason why there are two product standards agreements is that the health and safety concerns 
that arise in the production, trade and consumption of food, plant life and animals are considered 
to be particularly important. In effect, many SPS norms can be characterized as measures that are 
aimed at catastrophe avoidance – the spread of diseases, the probability of serious illness, and so 
on. Such considerations also arise with technical barriers to trade as these may have similar 
motivations – e.g. a ban on the use of lead paint, radioactive residues, etc. – but they often address 
other types of issues as well (e.g. radio frequency interference, interoperability, and so forth). 
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important dimension of what the WTO does in the area of product regulation is 
compiling information on new measures. WTO Members are required to notify the 
WTO of new measures that are not based on international standards. Over 45,000 
measures have been notified since 1995. The TBT and SPS committees have developed 
procedures that can used by governments to raise concerns they have regarding proposed 
or applicable product standards of another WTO member. This has come to be known 
as the “specific trade concerns” (STC) procedure (Horn et al., 2013). Between 
1995 and 2015, over 800 STCs pertaining to SPS or TBT measures were raised in 
the relevant committee, implying that fewer than 2% of notified measures raised 
concerns. This process is widely regarded as being a useful mechanism to address 
concerns raised – about 40% of STCs in the area of SPS have reportedly been 
resolved (WTO, 2015). Over time the STC mechanism has evolved – for example, 
in 2014 WTO Members agreed to a procedure through which they can seek the 
services of the Chair of the SPS Committee or another facilitator to help find a 
solution to their concerns.11  
Much prevailing regulation deals with services. The WTO has fewer disciplines 
for regulations affecting services than for goods (product regulation). Article VI.4 
of GATS calls on the Council for Trade in Services to develop any necessary disciplines 
to ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to 
trade in services,12 and Members may not apply regulatory requirements so as to 
nullify or impair specific commitments made for sectors/modes (Article VI.5(a)). 
The GATS therefore embodies a weak “least trade-restrictive” norm, but there is 
no obligation to use international standards – WTO Members may use whatever 
standards they wish. 
GATS Article VII (Recognition) promotes the establishment of procedures for 
(mutual) recognition of licenses, educational diplomas and experience granted by 
 
11 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/sps_10sep14_e.htm. (accessed December 10, 
2017) 
12 A Working Party on Domestic Regulation was mandated to develop disciplines called for by 
Article VI:4 to ensure that licensing and qualification requirements and related standards are not 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services. A precursor to this working party, the Working Party on 
Professional Services, agreed in 1998 on a set of principles to ensure transparency of regulations 
pertaining to licensing of accountants and accountancy services. 
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a particular Member. It permits a Member to recognize the standards of one or 
more Members, but does not require, or even encourage, Members recognize equivalent 
foreign regulations. Article VII:2 requires a Member who enters into a mutual 
recognition agreement (MRA) to afford adequate opportunity to other interested 
Members to negotiate their accession to such an agreement or to negotiate comparable 
ones. Article VII:3 stipulates that a Member must not grant recognition in a manner 
which would constitute a means of discrimination between countries. Members 
must inform the Council for Trade in Services about existing MRAs and of the 
opening of negotiations on any future ones. Most such notifications pertain to the 
recognition of educational degrees and professional qualifications obtained abroad. 
The WTO does little at present to support regulatory cooperation on a multilateral 
basis; the focus has been on national policies. This has included deliberations (in 
the context of the TBT Committee) on what constitutes good regulatory practice and 
options that governments can use to streamline the way regulations are prepared, 
adopted and applied through the “regulatory lifecycle.” An example is the deliberation 
that commenced in 2012 over voluntary guidelines that would reduce the possibility 
of product regulation having the effect of unnecessarily restricting trade. However, 
to date no agreement on a set of good practice guidelines has proved possible 
because of concerns that the Appellate Body might invoke such norms in a dispute, 
notwithstanding the fact that it would be explicit that they would be non-binding.13 
There is much more to be said about the state of play in the WTO on regulatory 
matters. The foregoing brief snapshot makes clear that the WTO is more involved 
than might be expected, but that many areas of regulation are not subject to multilateral 
rules of the game – especially service sector regulation. The role of the WTO as a 
transparency mechanism is much better developed for product regulation than it is 
for other types of regulation that have an impact on trade. The various committees 
and working parties dealing with different dimensions of economic regulation have 
acted as foci for deliberation and information exchange. More can certainly be 
done if governments are willing to do so, but the experience over the last decade 
 
13 The Appellate Body has held that a 2000 decision by the TBT Committee on a set of (voluntary) 
principles for the development of international standards, guides and recommendations was a 
“subsequent agreement” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; see Wijkström and 
McDaniels (2013). 
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or so with attempts to refine and expand disciplines on domestic regulation of services 
and to agree to voluntary principles of good practice for regulation illustrates that 
achieving a consensus in these areas may not be possible. As far as regulatory 
cooperation is concerned, one shortfall in the approach taken in the WTO has been 
the absence of a concerted effort by WTO Members to encourage international 
standardizing bodies to consider the trade effects of the norms that they develop 
(Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2016).  
 
V. REGULATORY COOPERATION IN PTAs 
 
How do PTAs compare to the WTO? There is of course huge heterogeneity, but 
most PTAs do not do much more than the WTO, while the one outlier, the EU, 
goes far beyond the WTO in the area of regulatory cooperation. The only other PTA 
that includes substantial regulatory cooperation in specific areas is the Australia-
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) (Steger, 
2012). The CPTPP does not go very far beyond the WTO – the value added primarily 
involves language aiming at greater coherence of regulatory regimes of the signatories 
(Bollyky, 2012), along with provisions calling for consultations (i.e. the shallow 
forms of cooperation discussed in Section 1).14  
The EU has used a mix of approaches to remove the market-segmenting effects 
of national product regulation, including harmonization and mutual recognition. 
The latter became a key driver following decisions of the European Court of Justice, 
which ruled that, in the absence of overriding concerns that permit an exception, EU 
members must accept products into their markets that have been legally introduced 
into the commerce of another member state. However, the EU experience illustrates 
that mutual recognition requires some minimum level of harmonization of norms 
(common “essential requirements”).15 
 
14 However, the CPTPP includes more detailed and far-reaching provisions on specific areas of 
regulation, notably with regard to digital trade and data localization. It also incorporates innovative 
provisions permitting data flows that were linked to (conditional on) action by exporting countries 
to protect privacy and prevent fraud. 
15 See Pelkmans (2012) for an in-depth discussion. 
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Recent PTAs involving the EU complement mutual recognition with efforts to 
move towards mutual “equivalence.” This involves agreement that the regulatory 
objectives of the parties involved are equivalent and acceptance that implementation 
and enforcement mechanisms in the parties’ jurisdictions are effective. Under a 
“standard” mutual recognition approach, A satisfies itself that B achieves its norms 
through the similar kind of testing, inspections, sampling and so on that A undertakes. 
Under regulatory equivalence, A simply accepts B’s processes and systems: each 
government agrees that the regulatory regime of the other party is equivalent to its 
own in terms of both objectives and the effectiveness of the institutional apparatus 
through which these objectives are pursued.16 A necessary condition for an equivalence 
approach is trust: there must be a prior process of “mutual assessment” (Messerlin, 
2014) or evaluation of the regulatory goals and implementation regime in the relevant 
jurisdictions that results in a judgment that these are “equivalent.” 
CETA — at the time of writing the most recent of the new type of trade integration 
agreements — includes some language on equivalence (Government of Canada, 2017). 
CETA calls for the establishment of a regulatory cooperation forum to facilitate and 
promote the realization of the objectives laid out in Chapter 21 on regulatory cooperation. 
The chapter provides that the parties may consult with stakeholders, including the 
research community, NGOs and business and consumer organizations “on matters 
relating to the implementation of” the regulatory cooperation chapter (Article 21.8). 
Article 21.2 commits both parties to developing their regulatory cooperation to prevent 
and eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade and investment; enhancing the climate for 
competitiveness and innovation, including through pursuing regulatory compatibility, 
recognition of equivalence and convergence; and adopting transparent, efficient and 
effective regulatory processes that better support public policy objectives and fulfil 
the mandates of regulatory bodies. Article 21.3 mentions such objectives of regulatory 
cooperation as building trust; deepening mutual understanding of regulatory governance 
and obtaining from each other the benefit of expertise and perspective to improve 
 
16 A key difference, therefore, is that regulatory equivalence requires a willingness to step back from 
a focus on technical product considerations and to assess systems as a whole. Thus, whereas mutual 
recognition means assessing country B’s meat inspection system on the basis of a sampling regime 
and the results of testing in country A of a sample of products originating in B, an approach based 
on regulatory equivalence would justify trust in a partner country’s products on the basis of 
systemic arguments. 
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regulatory proposals; promoting the transparency, predictability and efficacy of 
regulations; identifying alternative instruments; recognizing the associated effects 
of regulations; and improving regulatory implementation and compliance.  
Another objective of CETA is to facilitate bilateral trade and investment by reducing 
unnecessary differences in regulation and identifying new ways of cooperating in 
specific sectors. In a similar vein, the agreement mentions the complementary goal of 
enhancing the competitiveness of industry by looking for ways to reduce administrative 
costs and duplicative regulatory requirements, and “pursuing compatible regulatory 
approaches including, if possible and appropriate, through: a) the application of 
regulatory approaches which are technology-neutral, and b) the recognition of 
equivalence or the promotion of convergence” (Article 21.3(d)(iii); emphasis added). 
Language on — and examples of — regulatory equivalence embodied in CETA 
include Chapter 5 on SPS measures, which requires each signatory to accept the 
measures of the exporting party as equivalent to its own if the exporting party 
“objectively demonstrates that its measure achieves the importing Party’s appropriate 
level of protection” (Article 5.1). Guidelines for the determination of equivalence 
are set out in Annex 5.D to the SPS chapter, while Annex 5.E lists areas where the 
parties have agreed there is equivalence. One function of the CETA Joint Management 
Committee for SPS Measures is to prepare and maintain a document detailing the 
state of discussions between the parties on their work on recognizing the equivalence 
of specific SPS measures. A separate Protocol on the Mutual Recognition of the 
Compliance and Enforcement Programme regarding Good Manufacturing Practices 
for Pharmaceutical Products provides for the determination of the equivalence of 
regulatory authorities that certify compliance with these practices. Annex 1 (on 
Medicinal Products or Drugs) of this protocol lists products for which the parties 
have agreed that their requirements and compliance programs are equivalent.178 
CETA Chapter 21 (on regulatory cooperation) creates an entry point with respect 
to greater use of regulatory equivalence among like-minded countries, but puts 
 
17 Some mention of regulatory equivalence also occurs in the chapter on financial services, a sector 
where the approach has been pursued internationally for some time; see, for example, Verdier 
(2011). The chapter permits Canadian institutions to provide portfolio management services to 
EU professional clients on a cross-border basis (that is, without having to establish in the EU) 
once the European Commission has adopted the equivalence decision related to portfolio management 
(EU prudential requirements will still apply). 
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little emphasis on the use of equivalence as a way to reduce regulatory differences 
and costs. Indeed, the chapter, while laying out a rather long illustrative list of possible 
cooperation activities, does not mention “equivalence” in Articles 21.4, 21.5 or 21.7. 
Article 21.4(r) does call for identifying approaches to reduce the adverse effects of 
existing regulatory differences on trade, including “when appropriate, through greater 
convergence, mutual recognition, minimising the use of trade distorting regulatory 
instruments, and use of international standards,” but the activities listed in these 
articles focus on transparency and data and information sharing.  
Even though CETA goes further than the CPTPP on regulatory cooperation, it 
arguably does too little to reflect the changes in the way international trade is organized. 
More rapid progress in attenuating the trade-cost effects of different regulatory policies 
might be realized by creating processes and institutional mechanisms that take a 
broader value chain perspective (Hoekman, 2015). Concrete initiatives to reduce the 
costs of redundant regulatory requirements and processes must be policy specific 
— that is, they must involve the type of cooperation called for in CETA and that is 
already being pursued in the Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council. But missing 
from current approaches are cross-cutting, supply chain-informed deliberative 
mechanisms that focus on a broad range of policies that affect trade costs and that 
provide a framework for regulatory cooperation to improve the competitiveness 
and efficiency of industry — two goals that Canada and the EU set for themselves 
in the CETA chapter on regulatory cooperation (CETA Article 21.2(4)(b)). 
 
VI. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE TRADE EFFECTS OF  
BEHIND-THE-BORDER REGULATION 
 
Regulatory measures generally fulfil a specific social or economic purpose, even 
if the effect is to restrict trade. Addressing possible trade-reducing (distorting) effects 
of regulation requires first an understanding of the effects of prevailing (proposed) 
policies. Many desirable reforms will not require actions by other governments (trading 
partners), but regulatory cooperation may help in identifying what such reforms 
should seek to do and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation. Trade 
agreements may help by mobilizing and sustaining political attention and thereby 
overcome resistance by vested interests and incentivize regulatory bodies to give 
more of a priority to actions that reduce the negative trade impacts of regulation.  
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As already discussed, trade agreements are geared towards the negotiation of 
enforceable policy commitments. Binding disciplines reduce uncertainty for traders 
who know that the dispute settlement mechanism can be used to ensure that governments 
live up to what they sign on to. A precondition for agreement on binding international 
rules is a shared recognition that the negative spillovers associated with a policy 
(or set of policies) are significant and that a proposed set of (enforceable) disciplines 
will result in greater efficiency (lower costs). Such an understanding exists when 
it comes to tariffs and related border barriers, but much less so when it comes to 
domestic regulatory policies.  
It is important to recognize that trade agreements may not be useful mechanisms 
to support effective cooperation between regulators, even if trade negotiators have 
the best of intentions. Much depends here on what the agreement seeks to do and 
the safeguards that are included to provide assurances that regulatory goals will 
not be undercut. The public backlash against TTIP in the EU was largely driven 
by concerns that greater integration of the transatlantic marketplace may result in 
an erosion of regulatory regimes in areas that are of great importance to significant 
segments of the EU population – such as the use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) and specific food standards (Young, 2016). Regulatory cooperation is 
likely to be more easily pursued if it involves a bottom-up process that is driven 
by regulatory agencies, as opposed to being imposed top down as an element of a 
trade agreement. A useful prescription in this regard is to apply the principle “first, 
do no harm” and to concentrate on incorporating measures in trade agreements that 
can be defended as improving the ability of regulators to do their job better. That 
is, the aim should be empowerment of regulatory bodies rather than imposing 
restrictions on them (or being seen to be doing so even if that is not the intention).  
From a trade perspective, international cooperation on regulation arguably should 
center on improving the transparency of applied policies; supporting analysis of the 
trade (and investment) effects of specific types of regulation; giving regulators a 
mandate that encourages (permits) them to design regulations that do not unnecessarily 
restrict trade; and doing more to ensure that the process of international standards-
setting and norms-setting occurs with greater attention given to the potential trade 
impacts. Measures taken by the trade community to achieve these objectives should 
not affect the ability of regulators to do their job. 
Transparency. This is a core feature and function of the WTO. The regular work 
of the TBT and SPS Committees, including notifications and the opportunity to 
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raise specific concerns, can be emulated in other areas of regulation. Here an obvious 
area to prioritize are services and regulations that impact on the ability of firms to 
supply and consumers to buy products that are connected to/use “the cloud” (data 
localization requirements, etc.) The relevant GATS bodies have not ignored issues 
of domestic regulation (see above), but much more could be done to map out the 
policies that WTO Members are pursuing. The recent joint venture with the World 
Bank to maintain and update a database on services trade policies – the Services 
Trade Restrictiveness Indicators (STRI) – is a good first step, but this is mostly 
limited to policies that are discriminatory and do not cover domestic regulation. It 
is unlikely that this can rely only on notifications – it will require a pro-active effort 
by the WTO Secretariat, working with other international organizations. 
Much greater transparency is also needed as regards the operation and effects of 
PTAs. Insofar as PTAs give rise to innovative approaches to attenuate the market-
segmenting effects of differences in regulatory policies, they can help all countries 
identify approaches that can usefully be emulated. All WTO Members have a 
strong interest in understanding what PTAs end up doing and achieving, including 
their implementation, utilization and enforcement. Documenting and analyzing the 
approaches that are used in PTAs to reduce costs of regulatory heterogeneity would not 
only improve transparency per se, but can also inform a process of learning about what 
works and what does not and perhaps identify specific features of cooperation in PTAs 
that might be multilateralized. There have been some moves in this direction on an ad 
hoc basis; for example, the GATS Working Party on Domestic Regulation conducted 
a dedicated discussion on domestic regulation in regional trade agreements in 2014.  
Learning: analysis and deliberation. As noted previously, there is often relatively 
little, if any, effort by national regulators and international standards-setting bodies 
to consider the trade impacts of regulatory requirements and alternative approaches 
that might have less negative effects while not impacting on the probability that 
regulatory objectives will be realized. There is also arguably more that can be done 
to understand how the universe of regulatory measures maps into the categories 
defined in Figure 1 and the potential efficacy of the different types of international 
regulatory cooperation summarized in Figure 2. There would appear to be significant 
scope to use the WTO bodies that already have a mandate to discuss regulatory 
policies (TBT, SPS, services) to commission analysis of trade effects and to engage 
more regularly with the business community in discussions aimed at identifying 
where greater effort to pursue regulatory cooperation – which need not occur through 
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the WTO – could have a significant impact on trade costs. Currently there is too little 
scope for engagement with the business community within WTO bodies. There is 
more attention for this in recent PTAs like CETA, but even there the extent to which 
business is part of regulatory deliberation arguably is too limited (Hoekman, 2015).  
Give regulators a mandate to consider trade effects. A simple yet powerful 
change that WTO and PTA members could seek to achieve is to agree that regulatory 
processes include an assessment of trade effects – perhaps as part of broader regulatory 
impact assessments that are generally considered to be an element of good practice. 
This is already “on the table” in the deliberations on a voluntary code of good 
practice in the WTO TBT Committee. If no consensus can be achieved there – and 
given that in other areas of regulation, this agenda is being pursued – one way 
proponents could consider moving forward is through plurilateral approaches (see 
below). In order to increase the prospects that trade impact assessments are made, 
regulatory agencies should be provided with the necessary (financial) resources so 
that such an effort would not crowd out (or be seen to crowd out) other activities. 
Incorporation of “trade effects assessment” language in trade agreements is in itself 
an instrument through which regulatory agencies can lay claim on additional resources 
from the government that are needed to fulfil the commitment. 
Engaging with international standards-setting bodies. More generally, there is 
a clear case for more regular interaction with international regulatory bodies. Again this 
is something that already occurs on an ad hoc basis. For example, representatives of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board, the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International Organizations of Securities 
Commissions have been invited periodically by the GATS Committee on Trade and 
Financial Services to present recent developments in the area of international regulatory 
norms and initiatives in the financial sector and discuss possible implications for 
trade in financial services. However, this is largely limited to one-way information 
transmission. What would arguably make a difference is a greater effort by WTO 
Members – who are all represented in international standards-setting bodies – to 
include a focus on the trade effects of new international norms and standards. 
 
More plurilateral cooperation under the umbrella of the WTO? 
 
Going beyond greater transparency, analysis and interacting with international 
standards-setting bodies, at the level of the WTO consideration should be given to 
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facilitating more small-group cooperation on regulatory policies. Abstracting from 
informal discussion or working groups, there are two main alternative mechanisms 
for groups of WTO members to collaborate on an issue-specific agenda of common 
interest: conclusion of a Plurilateral Agreement (PA) under Article II.3 WTO, and 
so-called critical mass agreements (CMAs) (Lawrence, 2006). CMAs are agreements 
in which negotiated disciplines apply to only a subset of countries, but benefits are 
extended on a nondiscriminatory basis to all trading partners. An example of a 
CMA is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) – a so-called “zero-for-zero” 
agreement in which a group of countries agree to eliminate tariffs for a specific set 
of products and inscribe these commitments into their WTO schedules. CMAs 
have also been concluded to facilitate trade in services. Examples are agreements 
on basic telecommunications and on financial services that have been concluded 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The commitments defined in 
these agreements apply only to signatories, but their benefits accrue to all WTO 
members as the disciplines are applied on an nondiscriminatory basis.  
PAs differ from CMAs in that they may be applied on a discriminatory basis – 
that is, benefits need not be extended to non-signatories. There are currently only 
two PAs incorporated into the WTO: the Agreement on Civil Aircraft and the 
Agreement on Government Procurement. PAs are similar to PTAs in being designed 
to discriminate against countries that are not members, but an important difference 
with PTAs is that in the case of a PA the discrimination is limited to one policy 
area (the subject matter of the agreement). PTAs in contrast cover many sectors 
and policy areas. Indeed, WTO rules require that PTAs cover substantially all trade 
in goods and/or have substantial sectoral coverage of services. 
PTAs differ from both PAs and CMAs in tending to be closed clubs – most PTAs 
do not include an accession clause. Those PTAs that do allow for accession often restrict 
it to countries in a specific geographic region. This helps explain the proliferation 
of PTAs – a new agreement often must be negotiated between members of any given 
PTA and a non-member, because it is not possible for a non-member to join an 
existing trade agreement. Both CMAs and PAs are open in the sense that in principle 
any WTO Member can join if it wants to and is able to satisfy whatever disciplines 
are embodied in the agreement. 
There are good reasons for WTO members to attempt to do more via plurilateral 
initiatives as these allow countries with an interest in cooperating on a policy area to 
do so without being held back by countries that are not interested in doing so. Arguments 
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that have been raised against more cooperation on a plurilateral basis under the WTO 
umbrella revolve around their potential precedent-setting and negative spillover effects 
on countries that decide not to join, the fact that rules, even if they apply only to 
signatories will be defined by those that initially negotiate an agreement, and possible 
resource implications for the WTO Secretariat. Another downside risk associated 
with plurilateral initiatives is that they may reduce the ability of (scope for) countries 
to pursue issue-linkage strategies that are needed for developing countries to obtain 
concessions in areas that are of importance to them. Finally, and most concern to 
non-participants is that plurilaterals that take the form of PAs will be discriminatory. 
These considerations are less salient for CMAs than for PAs and the former will 
apply on a nondiscriminatory basis. However, as discussed in greater depth by 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015), CMAs and PAs are unlikely to have significant 
negative welfare impacts on non-signatories. In the case of CMAs this is relatively 
unambiguous because they will apply on a nondiscriminatory basis and do not impose 
any obligations on nonparticipants. In the case of PAs the potential downside risks 
are low given that they must be approved by the WTO Membership as a whole. Insofar 
as there are serious concerns on the part of non-signatories, they can block such 
agreements. In assessing the case for plurilateral initiatives in the WTO context it 
is important to consider the counterfactual. In practice this will comprise countries 
negotiating PTAs that are inherently discriminatory. Despite PTAs being subject 
to review by the WTO, there is no effective ex ante discipline on their content: WTO 
review is limited to the supply of information. Both CMAs and PAs are more transparent 
than PTAs as they involve formal scheduling of commitments by signatories and 
regular reporting on activities to the WTO Membership as a whole. They imply less 
dispersion in rules and approaches – and thus transactions costs and trade diversion 
– than PTAs. Indeed, they offer a way to multilateralize elements of what may be 
covered in PTAs. Multiple PTAs dealing with the same subject matter often do so 
in ways that imply that the rules of the game for firms differ depending on the PTA 
that applies for a given trade flow. 
There is no formal constraint on the ability of a club of WTO Members to pursue 
CMAs that involve deepening of disciplines on policies that are already subject to 
WTO rules, as long as they are willing to apply these on an MFN basis (Hoekman 
and Mavroidis, 2017). There is, however, a major constraint that impedes the feasibility 
of pursuing new PAs under WTO auspices: incorporation of a PA into the WTO 
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requires unanimity “exclusively by consensus.”18 The consensus requirement is 
an important safeguard to ensure that PAs do not negatively affect non-signatories. 
That said, it is also a major disincentive for countries to pursue new PAs and thus 
acts as an incentive for countries to take the PTA route. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015; 
2017) argue consideration be given to exploring ways in which countries can continue 
to ensure that new PAs will not have detrimental spillover effects without giving 
just one or a small group of nations veto power. They suggest that WTO Members 
set up a task force on a code of conduct for new plurilateral agreements that apply to 
and benefit only signatories and consider replicating a GATS provision permitting 
WTO Members to make additional commitments in the GATT, so as to facilitate the 
negotiation of new CMAs that deal with regulatory policies that affect trade in goods. 
Such a code would establish basic principles that new club-based agreements need 
to satisfy to be consistent with the principles of the multilateral trading system, as 
well as substantive criteria for the rejection of proposals to pursue such cooperation 
under WTO auspices. 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The gradual reduction of tariffs as part of a more general process to open economies 
to international trade and investment flows, in conjunction with technological 
changes that are permitting the digitization of products and increasing the share of 
services in global production, have greatly increased the impacts of differences in 
domestic regulation of products and production processes. The future international 
trade agenda is likely to become largely a regulatory agenda, the challenge being 
to devise mechanisms to reduce the costs of differences in regulatory regimes while at 
the same time ensuring that this does not erode the likelihood of attaining the regulatory 
objectives that have been established by the polities of countries that engage in trade.  
In principle, regulatory cooperation may bolster the ability of regulators to attain 
regulatory objectives if it is designed with that objective in mind. Indeed, in practice this 
is likely to be a necessary condition for cooperation to be feasible. A key question for 
governments is whether trade agreements are a useful instrument to guide regulatory 
 
18 See Article X.9 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
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cooperation and if so, how regulatory matters should be addressed in trade agreements. 
In some areas, such as technical regulation of products, there are now well-established 
and reasonably effective mechanisms in the WTO through which the potential negative 
externalities of differences in standards can be identified, discussed and attenuated. In 
many other areas of regulation – such as prudential regulation of services, “private 
standards” systems that apply to international production processes, or standards 
of protection of worker rights and the environment – WTO members have yet to put 
in place such mechanisms. The same is largely true of PTAs – while there is much 
discussion of new vintage PTAs as instruments for regulatory convergence, to date 
steps to address such matters have been limited. 
Neither PTAs nor the WTO engage on the substance of regulatory norms – the 
focus is on the trade-impeding effects of differences in regulatory standards. Cooperation 
on substantive norms – international standardization – is left to specialized bodies 
in which regulators interact. These bodies tend to be technical and focused on defining 
the means to achieve specific regulatory objectives (health, safety, etc.). They generally 
do not consider the potential impacts on trade. One role that the WTO could play 
looking forward is doing more to ensure that international regulatory efforts consider 
trade effects when developing new international norms. More generally, the WTO 
(and trade agreements more generally) could be used as a focal point for encouraging 
regulators to interact with each other and to consider cooperation that enhances their 
joint ability to attain regulatory objectives at lower cost. The suggestions made above 
regarding the form this could take illustrate the potential positive role that trade agreements 
can play. Whether they will be pursued depends importantly on the stance taken by 
international business. A necessary condition is strong advocacy by international 
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